I affirm. Force is deadly if it tends to kill, regardless of whether it always does—for example, a disease that kills 30% of those it afflicts is considered deadly even though 70% survive.

Repeated domestic violence occurs only in the context of a state’s failure to intervene or protect victims. This is because for the abuse to continue without end, no intervention on the part of the government has occurred to prevent the batterer from continuing to harm the victim. Additionally, instances of repeated abuse empirically occur when there has been no police involvement—studies confirm that government intervention, whether or not it leads to arrest, prevents repetition of domestic violence. Richard **Felson, *et al.*** in ’05:[[1]](#footnote-1)

In Table 2, we present **the** main additive model, based on **logistic regression [model]**. To determine whether the model adequately fit the distributional properties of the data, we performed a Hosmer and Lemeshow test (2000). This test **indicated** a reasonably good fit (Chi-square = 10.3, df = 8, p = .24). The coefficients in Table 2 reveal **strong evidence of a deterrent effect for reporting.** (Recall that the sign is reversed because reporting without arrest is the reference category). The results show that **offenders are much less likely to repeat** their offense **when an incident is reported** to the police. **Not reporting increases the odds of a repeat**ed offense **by 89%** (e.64 – 1 = .89). However, our results do not indicate evidence of a deterrent effect for arrest. The coefficient is in the predicted direction, but it is small and not statistically significant. The results suggest that reporting deters offenders from committing another assault whether the police make an arrest or not.

Further, there are multiple causative warrants for why state failure is tied to the repetition of abuse. **Felson, *et al.* 2** continue:

The effect of reporting on recidivism in this data is fairly strong. The result suggests that the reporting of partner violence to the police is a deterrent, even if the police do not make an arrest. **It may be that** a visit from **the police change**s **the offenders’ attitudes toward their behavior**. Offenders may redefine their behavior **as** a **criminal** act **rather than** a **private** matter. It may also change their perception of the costs of further violence. **Offenders may be deterred by** the **stigma** associated with a visit by the police for domestic violence**, or they may anticipate future arrest** if they re-offend. Future research should examine how offenders view police intervention and why it deters them from re-offending. **Finally, it is possible that the couples seek counseling** or some other social services **as a result of the** police **visit** and that these interventions influence the offender. In other words, these factors may mediate the reporting effect.

Thus, domestic violence would not be repeated given state intervention. And, the resolution speaks of permissibility rather than obligation. This gives the victims a license or right to act when they choose. Thus, specific disadvantages just prove when victims are obligated not to act, but do not disprove that they *could* have the choice.

The resolution questions what constitutes appropriate punishment for domestic abuse, so the value is **justice**, defined as giving each their due. Notions of desert are predicated on whether an actor is morally blameworthy for a crime. The structure of law implies that desert is derived solely from practical reason. Stephen **Morse[[2]](#footnote-2)** writes:

**For** the **law and morality,** then, **a person is a practical reasoner**. The legal view of the person is not that all people always reason and behave consistently rationally according to some pre-ordained, normative notion of rationality. It is simply that people are creatures who are **capable of acting** for and consistently **with** their **reasons for action** and who are generally capable of minimal rationality according to mostly conventional, socially-constructed standards of rationality. The rules of morality and criminal law essentially reflect our expectations of what we owe each other. In criminal law, we mostly owe duties of non-malfeasance, but we sometimes also owe duties of beneficence. According to dominant theories of just punishment, **it is unjust to** blame or **punish anyone who does not deserve to be punished.** Desert is thus at least a necessary condition of just punishment. Desert in criminal law is in turn based on a retrospective evaluation of the agent’s behavior. If the criminal **law operates by guiding the conscious actions of persons capable of [rationally] understanding the rules** and rationally applying them, **it would be** unfair and thus **unjust**ified **to punish** and inflict pain intentionally on **those** who did not act intentionally or who were **incapable of** the minimum degree of **rationality required for** normatively **acceptable cooperative interaction.** People who lack the capacity for rational guidance are not morally responsible and should not be held criminally culpable. They do not deserve to be punished.

Holding an agent accountable based on the content of their will is the only way to coherently distinguish between crimes and accidents, and to assign blame. If moral censure is impossible, then all action is trivially permissible, as there can be no obligation not to take an action. Moreover, reason is closed under reflection—any attempt to question a moral duty involves asking for a reason to be bound by it. Reasons are the basic currency of ethical reflection, and moral norms will be binding when they flow from that reason itself.

To determine the stringency of duties derived from a maxim, all rational agents must be able to will the maxim, since there is no reason to reject a maxim for one person while making it sufficient to guide the actions of another. If ethics are based in rationality, any state of affairs or actor-specific concern is irrelevant, because it doesn’t appeal *a priori* to reason. This leaves only maxims that can be applied as universal law as capable of guiding action.

Because political structures exist to regulate interactions between distinct, free agents, the paramount obligation of a state is to ensure the independence of those it governs. Denying the value of independence is rationally contradictory. Stephen **Engstrom[[3]](#footnote-3)** writes:

Now on the interpretation we have been entertaining, **applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it is possible for every subject** capable of practical judgment to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every subject’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it is possible for every such subject **to deem good every subject’s acting to limit others’ outer freedom**, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own outer freedom. Since **here all subjects are** on the one hand **deeming good** both **the limitation of others’** outer **freedom and the extension of their own** outer freedom, **while** on the other hand**, insofar as they agree with the** similar **judgments of others**, also determining good the limitation of their own outer freedom and the extension of others’ outer freedom, **they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of** both **their own and others’** outer **freedom. These judgments are inconsistent** insofar as the extension of a person’s outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of the same freedom.

There is an obligation to maintain individuals’ outer freedom, or independence. However, as individuals’ wants will always overlap, the state must enforce restrictions on agents’ autonomy. This generates a system of equal, but limited, freedom. Arthur **Ripstein[[4]](#footnote-4)** clarifies:

**Independence** is the basic principle of right. It **guarantees equal freedom**, and so requires that no person be subject to the choice of another. The idea is again similar to one that has been the target of many objections. The basic form of almost all of these focuses on the fact **[The main objection is] that any** set of **rules** stops people from doing what they would otherwise do, so that, for example, laws prohibiting personal injury and property damage **put limits on the ability of people to do as they wish. [But]** Not everyone can be allowed to do as they please, because **different people have incompatible wants**, and to let one person do what he wants will typically require preventing others from doing what they want. Thus, it has been contended, freedom cannot even be articulated as a political value, because freedoms must always be traded off against other goods. This objection has some force against freedom understood as the ability to do whatever you wish, but fails to engage Kant’s conception of independence. **Limits on independence generate** a set of **restrictions that are** by their nature **equally applicable to all**. Their generality reflects the extent to which they abstract from what Kant calls the “matter” of choice and **focus[ing]** instead **on the capacity to set purposes without having them set by others**. What you can accomplish depends on what others are doing – someone else can frustrate your plans by getting the last quart of milk in the store. If they do so, they don’t interfere with your independence, because they impose no limits on your ability to use your powers to set and pursue your own purposes. They just change the world in ways that make your means useless for the particular purpose you would have set.

Therefore, the standard is **consistency with a system of equal freedom**. There are two additional warrants:

**First,** ethical theories only have force in obliging persons—or those who are beings. In order to be defined as a being, you must have independence. **Ripstein 2** furthers:

The core idea of independence is an articulation of the distinction between persons and things. **A person is a being capable of setting** his or her own **purposes**, while a thing is something that can be used in pursuit of purposes. Kant follows Aristotle in distinguishing choice from mere wish on the grounds that **to choose something a person must** take himself to **have means** available **to achieve it.** You can wish that you could fly, but you cannot choose to fly unless you have or acquire means that enable you to. In this sense, having means with which to pursue purposes is **conceptually prior to setting** those **purposes.** In the first instance, **the means that you have**, just **as a matter of** what Kant calls “the **innate** right of **humanity**” in your own person, **are your** own **bodily abilities. You are independent if you are the one who decides the purposes your means will be used to pursue.** You are dependent on someone else’s choice if that person gets to decide what purposes your means will be used to pursue. This recasting of the familiar Kantian distinction between means and ends provides a distinctive understanding of the ways in which **one person can interfere with** the independence of **another, either by drawing that person into purposes that she has not chosen, or by depriving her of her means.** Fraud is a familiar example of the first type of interference, bodily injury a familiar example of the second. In doing either, the wrongdoer fails to respect the other person’s capacity to set her own purposes, treating her instead either as a means to be used in pursuit of another person’s purposes, or as a mere obstacle to be gotten around.

Thus, independence is a prerequisite to endorsing any end as valuable.

**Second,** independence, understood as the ability to will an action without interference, is a pre-requisite to the fulfillment of moral imperatives. If a theory obligated us to act contrary to the constraints of equal freedom, then it would obligate us to act contrary to the ability to act, and thus no logically coherent moral theory can deny an obligation to preserve equal freedom.

It is my contention that, **first**, the structure of equal freedom requires punishment for violations of independence. As the duty to punish is an *a priori* obligation, it applies to any actor, as individuals under a rightful condition are equivalent to those acting for the ends of the state. There is a general obligation to punish crimes, even if the state is unable to do so. **Ripstein 3[[5]](#footnote-5)** continues:

In crimes against person and property, the criminal treats his victim as a mere thing. As such, the victim is entitled to private redress in the form of damages. But **the criminal** also **turns** the structure of **a rightful condition against itself**, using it as the means through which another can be wronged with impunity. Persons concerned to protect their rightful honor could not authorize a condition in which that can happen; to allow it would be to authorize wrongdoing provided that damages were paid. **The person who** sets out to **wrong[s] another cannot merely** be made to disgorge his gains or **pay damages. Such payment could** in principle **entitle the criminal to wrong his victim**, as a matter of right, simply **by paying the** requisite **fee. The state can only prevent this** from happening **by threatening to visit the wrongdoer’s wrong back upon him**, so that the wrong does not become a possible means through which he pursues his ends. The threat of **punishment makes the wronging of the victim normatively unavailable**, that is, it is something that the wrongdoer cannot rightfully acquire through his act.

Equal freedom requires there be no coercion between parties; punishing those who violate other’s independence thus restores the relational equilibrium and assures that the parties are again equal. In a situation of equal freedom, there is an additional obligation to revisit the crime upon the criminal as by limiting one agent’s independence, he wills a maxim that his own independence be similarly limited, so there is an obligation to treat him as he has determined all agents must be treated.

And, proportionality is a flawed measure of just punishment, because (**a**) it’s sometimes impossible to be proportional, e.g. we can’t kill a serial killer ten times, so there are always exceptions; (**b**) there’s no brightline determining what constitutes a reciprocal response; (**c**) obligations to punish must be derived from practical reason *a priori,* but proportionality constraints only operate *a posteriori,* once we know what the end results of the crime have been; and (**d**) responses must be equivalent, not equal, so we don’t need to be wholly proportional so long as we are limiting the independence of others to the same degree they limit that of their victims.

Additionally, domestic violence is empirically deadly, so deadly force is proportional. Judith **Koons** in ’06:[[6]](#footnote-6)

Every fifteen seconds a woman is beaten in the United States. **An estimated 1** million **to 4.8 million** women **are assaulted by their intimate partners** every year. More precise figures are difficult to adduce because **intimate assaults** of women **are only reported in one-fourth** to one-seventh **of all cases.** However, a number of sources estimate that one-third to one-half of all American women endure at least one physical assault by a partner during adulthood, and that up to twenty-five percent of all intimate relationships are marked by violence toward a female partner. Between 2,000 and 4,000 **women die** each year **at the hands of abusers,** many of whom are husbands and boyfriends. **Thirty percent of female murder victims** in 1990 **were killed by their husbands or boyfriends**, prompting one scholar to describe the phenomenon as "Intimate Femicide."

Finally, even if specific instances of domestic violence are not proportional to deadly force, the repeated and limitless nature of domestic violence means that the harm to independence is particularly severe. A culture of abuse places women in a state of “learned helplessness,” limiting their independence not only by harming them but also by making them incapable of setting their own ends. Independence dictates what proportional punishment is, and the limitation of agency by domestic violence is proportional to that by deadly force as a response.

**Second,** an imbalance between the relative strengths of the batterer and the victim justifies the victim’s responding with whatever means are available to them. Respect for rational agency as independence entails respect for your own agency, so you have an obligation not to be treated as a mere means, no matter what means you take to defend your independence. **Ripstein 4[[7]](#footnote-7)** argues:

**The** same **right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates** what Kant calls **an “internal duty”** of rightful honor, **which “consists in** asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying **do not mak[ing]**e **yourself into a mere means for others** but be at the same time an end for them.” Kant says that this duty can “be explained…as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person.” Kant’s characterization of this as an “internal duty” may seem out of place, given his earlier characterization of the Universal Principle of Right in terms of restrictions on each person’s conduct in light of the freedom of others. But the duty of rightful honor is also relational: it is a duty because it is a limit on the exercise of a person’s freedom that is imposed by the Universal Principle of Right. Just as the rights of others restrict your freedom, so that you cannot acquire a right to anything by acting in ways with [that violate] the innate right of another person, so, too, the humanity in your own person restricts the ways in which you can exercise your freedom by entering into arrangements with others. Your innate right prevents you from being bound by others more than you can in turn bind them; your duty of rightful honor prevents you from making yourself bound by others in those ways. Rightful honor does not warn you away from some juridical possibility that would somehow be demeaning or unworthy. You do not wrong yourself if you enter into a binding arrangement inconsistent with the humanity in your own person. Instead, **your duty of rightful honor says that no** such **arrangement [inconsistent with your innate right] can be binding, so no other person could be entitled to enforce a claim** of right **against you that [you have not agreed to.]** presupposes that you have acted contrary to rightful honor.

Thus, agents who are made the mere means of others have had their independence violated, and are permitted to restore that independence through whatever means necessary, including deadly force. This also justifies agents’ acting in accordance with self-defense, in order to prevent the violation of their agency.

Next, the imbalance between capacities of abuser and victim means that the only available means for the victim is deadly force. Rocco **Cipparone[[8]](#footnote-8)** writes:

Similarly, **a woman who has killed her batterer** during an acute battering incident usually will be able to **[can] show that it was reasonable for her to believe that resort to deadly force was necessary to avoid the threatened harm. The natural disparity in physical strength between men and women** and the relative lack of physical combat training of women **substantiate the reasonableness of the defendant's use of deadly force. A battered woman who was unable to defend herself against prior attacks by her batterer, thereby suffering severe bodily injury, should be in a particularly good position to establish the reasonableness of her resort to deadly force.** In most cases, therefore, the imminence and necessity requirements will not preclude a successful self-defense claim by a battered woman who has killed her batterer during an attack.

The right to self-defense can only be realized through deadly force, so agents are minimally permitted to defend their independence through these means. Additionally, the limitation in physical capacities restricts the victim’s innate right of humanity to use her available means according to her own discretion. Thus, she is not fully agential and cannot be held culpable based on the content of her rational will.

**Third** and finally,state failure places individuals outside a rightful condition. Because the abuse is repeated, the state fails to protect its citizens and a temporary state of nature is induced, since the contract between the citizen and the state has been nullified. Individuals do not cede the monopoly of force to a state in a situation where doing so does not preserve their independence. Thus, in the context of the state’s failure to remain a rightful condition, individuals are justified in using force to defend the ability to set ends.

Additionally, in a situation where the state cannot enforce justice, there is no obligation to restrain one’s actions if others refuse to do so. Thus, victims cannot be assured they will not be battered, and have no reason to refrain from using deadly force. Immanuel **Kant[[9]](#footnote-9)** writes:

**When** I declare (by word or deed), “**I will that an external thing** shall **be mine**,” **I** thereby **declare it obligatory for everyone else to refrain from [using] the object** of my will. This is an obligation that no one would have apart from this juridical act of mine. **Included in this claim**, however, **is an acknowledgment of being reciprocally bound to everyone else to [exercise] a similar** and equal **restraint with respect to what is theirs. The obligation** involved here **comes from a universal rule of** the external juridical relationship [that is, the **civil society**]. Consequently, **I am not bound to leave what is another’s** [property] untouched **if everyone else does not** in turn **guarantee to me** with regard to what is mine **that he will act in accordance with** exactly **the same principle.** This guarantee does not require a special juridical act, but is already contained in the concept of being externally juridically bound to a duty [*Verpflichtung*] on account of the universality, and hence also the reciprocity, of an obligation coming from a universal rule. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, **a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom** in accordance with universal laws. **Therefore, only a Will binding everyone** else—that is, collective universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that **can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to** general **external** (that is, public) **legislation that is backed by power is the civil society.** Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mind only in a civil society.

**STANDARDS EXPANSION**—read on their framework

The structure of reason implies that moral action can only be taken from the motive of duty. Therefore, any state attempt to impose the moral law in fact undermines the moral law’s force. The state can only serve as a mediator to preserve the independence of each citizen, such that each citizen can actualize her own duty to be a moral agent. **Ripstein[[10]](#footnote-10)** writes:

**Kant draws** a series of sharp **divisions between right and ethics. Ethical conduct depends upon the maxim on which an action is done; rightful conduct depends only on the outer form of interaction between persons. The inner nature of ethical conduct means that the only incentive consistent with the autonomy at the heart of morality must be morality itself; rightful conduct can be induced by incentives provided by others.** Other persons are entitled to enforce duties of right, but not duties of virtue.

Their standard fails to take into account the obligations of the state in mediating interpersonal affairs. This means that their purely ethical framework either (a) fails in action, or (b) is irrelevant to the state as an actor.

**FRONTLINES FOR FELSON, *ET AL.* STUDY**

**Study weighing**—prefer longitudinal analysis to cross-sectional analysis because it tracks a population over time rather than at a specific moment and accounts for short-term versus long-term phenomena.

**AT: Retaliation means intervention increases violence**—the Felson study revealed no statistically significant increases in abuse for both victim and third-party reporting. Felson, *et al*:

We hypothesized that offenders might retaliate when victims reported the incident rather than third parties, when victims signed complaints, and when these actions led to arrest. To test these hypothesis, we restricted analyses to those incidents that were reported (see Table 4). The coefficient for victim-reported is not significantly significant (b=.16, p=.43). The result suggests that recidivism does not depend on who reports the incident to the police.

To examine whether offenders retaliate when the victim’s reporting leads to their arrest, we added an interaction term: victim-reported × offender arrested. The term is not statistically significant (Table 4, upper right quadrant). The evidence suggests that victims who call the police and cause their partner to be arrested do not suffer retaliation.

To examine the hypothesis that offenders retaliate if the victim signs a complaint against them we substituted victim complaint for victim reporting (see Table 4). The results provide no support for this hypothesis. The coefficient is in the opposite direction, but not statistically significance (b=-.35, p=. 07). To examine whether offenders are more likely to retaliate if the victim’ s complaint led to an arrest, we added an interaction term, victim complaint x arrest. The term is not statistically significant, suggesting no support for the hypothesis.

**AT: You don’t take into account female batterers/same-sex couples**—actually, the study does, and there is no statistically significant deviation from the overall findings, even though men are more likely to engage in violence in general. Felson, *et al*:

The effect of gender (offender male) is positive but nonsignificant in Table 2, suggesting that women are just as likely to re-offend as are men. This result, however, may be affected by the inclusion of prior violence in the equation. Other analyses (not presented in tabular form) show that males are more likely to have engaged in violence before the intervention incident (b=.68; p< .001). When we re-estimated the equation omitting prior violence, we do observe a gender effect (b=.48; p<.01), while observing similar (although sometimes slightly larger) effects for the other variables.

Our sample includes some same-sex couples (48 homosexual couples and 97 lesbian couples) and it is possible that they are affecting our results. To explore this possibility, we added first a term for victim gender, and then a multiplicative term for the gender of the offender and victim. These gender effects were small and statistically nonsignificant (analyses not presented), suggesting similar results for heterosexual and homosexual couples.

**AT: Other studies**—their study ignores half the evidence—they need to take into account violence that isn’t reported to the state in order to prove deterrence doesn’t happen. Felson, *et al*:

A substantial limitation of the domestic violence experiments is that they ignored a large number of domestic violence incidents that are of significant theoretical and policy interest—those incidents that are unreported. Expanding the universe of interest to include unreported incidents allows for the study of the effects of police involvement as well as the study of arrest. Since many assaults involving intimate partners go unreported, the inclusion of these incidents has implications for a much larger number of victims who are at risk of repeated violence.

**AT: Minneapolis experiment (Sherman and Berk)**—at first, the experiment was inconclusive on the issue of deterrence because of the study’s limitations, but the evidence goes my way when these limitations were later accounted for. Felson, *et al*:

Prior research on the effects of arrest on re-offending is based largely on data from the well-known Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and its replications (Berk, Campbell, Klap, and Western 1992; Dunford, Huizinga, and Elliott 1990; Hirschel, Hutchinson, Dean, Kelley, and Pesackis 1990; Pate and Hamilton 1992; Sherman 1992; Sherman and Berk 1984). These studies focused on men who committed misdemeanor assaults against their female partners. The evidence from these studies is mixed. Some researchers reported that arrest deters future assault (e.g., Sherman and Berk 1984) while other research reported an increase in the likelihood of repeat offenses after arrest under certain conditions (e.g., Sherman, Schmidt, Rogan, and Smith 1992). Maxwell, Garner, & Fagan (2001; 2002) reanalyzed the combined data from these experiments and found that whether a deterrent effect of arrest was observed depended upon the measurement of the outcome. Specifically, official records failed to reveal a deterrent effect, while a modest deterrent effect was observed when analyzing a subsample of victims for whom self-reported measures of repeat victimization were available.

The experimental nature of these studies inspires confidence in causal inferences about the effects of arrest. The studies did, however, have some important limitations. Sherman (1992) and Sherman and Berk (1984), for example, noted evidence that the random assignment to the arrest condition in the original experiment was not strictly followed by the police officers. This problem was addressed, however, in the subsequent replication studies. Another limitation was that, for practical reasons, all of the studies limited the analysis of arrest effects to cases where the offender was present when the police arrived. Thus, the external validity of the experimental studies is problematic because only some incidents were eligible for inclusion in the study, and because the police used some discretion in applying the rules of inclusion.

Finally, because of ethical issues, the studies analyzed only misdemeanor assaults. From a policy standpoint, it may be even more important to understand whether punishment deters more serious criminal offenders because they are the most dangerous (Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, and Matsueda 1986). Formal deterrence policies may be less effective against the most violent offenders, if these offenders are less likely to engage in long-range risk assessment (Jacobs and Wright 1999; Shover and Honaker 1992). In other words, offenders who commit the most serious types of violence may be the most difficult to deter.

**Study Methodology**—2564 respondents to the NCVS survey, 1992-2002. Felson, *et al.*

In the current study, we use longitudinal data from the NCVS to examine whether reporting and arrest affect whether intimate partner assault is repeated. Unlike the domestic violence experiments, we include both misdemeanors and felonies so we can determine whether deterrence depends on the seriousness of the offense. We also examine whether deterrence depends on whether the offender had a prior history of violence against the victim or not, and whether the offense was a sexual assault (versus a physical assault).

Controlling for offense severity allows us to address the possibility that the most serious offenders are more likely to be reported and arrested and also more likely to re-offend. Such a pattern would produce a spurious, positive relationship between police intervention and the repeat of the offense. In addition, we control for violence by the offender against the victim before the incident where we measure police intervention. This measure serves essentially as a lagged variable in our longitudinal analyses, and increases confidence in causal inferences.

We test the retaliation hypotheses by determining whether recidivism is more likely if the victim, rather than a third party, reported the incident and if the victim signed a complaint. In addition, we examine whether the victim’s actions are particularly likely to result in recidivism if they led to an arrest, in other words, whether there is an interaction between arrest and victim reporting or complaint.

Following the stake in conformity hypothesis, we examine statistical interactions between reporting and arrest, on the one hand, and marital status, race, and socioeconomic status, on the other. Reporting and arrest may have stronger effects on offenders who are married, white, and of higher socioeconomic status if they have stronger bonds to their communities. Finally, we examine the main effects of the offender’s social-demographic characteristics and use of alcohol or drugs. It is possible that offenders who commit violence while under the influence of alcohol or drugs are more likely to repeat their offense.

We based our analyses on NCVS data for the years 1992-2002. Because respondents are interviewed six times over the course of a three-year interview cycle, these data permit an examination of multiple assaults involving the same offender and victim through the construction of a longitudinal file. We examined characteristics of assaults that occur early in the interview cycle (the “intervention incident”) and determined whether the victim was assaulted later in the cycle by the same offender (the “repeat incident”). The sample included 2564 respondents who were victimized by their spouses, ex-spouses, or other intimate partners.

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